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An Introduction to the
Law & Economics of Information
Tim Wu†

Information is an extremely complex phenomenon not fully understood
by any branch of learning, yet one of enormous importance to contemporary
economics, science, and technology. (Gleick 2012, Pierce 1980). Beginning
from the 1970s, economists and legal scholars, relying on a simplified “public
good” model of information, have constructed an impressively extensive body
of scholarship devoted to the relationship between law and information. The
public good model tends to justify law, such as the intellectual property laws
or various forms of securities regulation that seek to incentivize the
production of information or its broader dissemination.
A review of the last several decades of scholarship based on the public
choice model suggests the following two trends. First, scholars have extended
the public good model of information to an ever-increasing number of fields
where law and information intersect. An incomplete list of fields covered
includes intellectual property, securities regulation, financial regulation,
contract theory, financial regulation, consumer protection, communications,
and the study of free speech. While scholars in all of these fields are
interested in information, they tend to focus on different market failures and
different properties of information. Generally speaking, scholars of
intellectual property have focused on problems of underproduction – the
concern that, absent government intervention, less than optimal amounts of
information will be produced. In contrast, scholars in other fields, like
securities regulation or consumer protection, analyze the dissemination of
information, or “information asymmetries” -- failures to distribute
information in an optimal fashion.
Second, over the last decade, scholars have sharply questioned the
simplified model, and ask whether, in practice, information actually has the
characteristics of a public good. The public good model of information relies
on two purported qualities: (1) that information tends to be difficult or
impossible to exclude others from, and (2) that its consumption does not
eliminate its value for others. The first assumption, in particular, has
undergone considerable attack; a closer look suggests that context, subject
matter, and industry structure tends to yield great variation in how much
intervention really is required to ensure adequate production or
†
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dissemination. This tends to support the existence of dynamic legal regimes
attuned to differences in subject matter or perhaps industry structure.
The review closes by asking if the public good model, while wellestablished, and relatively easy to understand, ought really be the exclusive
focus of the economic and legal understanding of information. The article
closes by considering other, less investigated, but potentially important,
properties of information that have not received as much scholarly attention.

Information’s Peculiar Characteristics
Information is a complex abstraction that has been the subject of
intense study by scientists and philosophers for more than a century. It
remains incompletely understood: some physicists, for example, believe that
every particle and force in the universe might actually be best understood as
a form of information. (Wheeler 1990). In the sciences, a minimal, though not
uncontested definition of information defines it “as one or more statements or
facts that are received by a human and that have some form of worth to the
recipient.” (Losee 1998).
What are the economic properties of this abstraction? Economists and
legal scholars have generally been uninterested in the scientist’s concept of
information, and instead more captivated by the premise that information is
a “public good.” Stated otherwise, the economic and legal scholarship has
sought to analyze information as a member of a category of goods first
described in modern times by John Stuart Mill (1848) as those that require
public intervention to ensure an adequate supply of.
If Mill did not invent the model, he certainly popularized it. His most
famous example of a public good was the lighthouse – something from which
all benefited, but might be unwilling to pay for privately. Other classic
examples of public goods include a strong national defense, clean air, and so
on, and Mill may have seeded the current treatment of information by
describing knowledge as follows. “The cultivation of speculative knowledge”
wrote Mill, “though one of the most useful of all employments, is a service
rendered to a community collectively, not individually, and one consequently
for which it is, primâ facie, reasonable that the community collectively should
pay.”
In 1954, economist Paul Samuelson stated Mill’s idea more precisely
by describing what he called a “collective consumption good.” According to
Samuelson, the category included those goods which “. . . all enjoy in common
in the sense that each individual's consumption of such a good leads to no
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subtractions from any other individual's consumption of that good . . . .”1 In
1962, Kenneth Arrow provided one of the first linkages between Samuelson’s
concept and intellectual property regimes, like patents, by which government
intervenes in the market for information.2 And by the 1980s, it had become
commonplace to link a public good model to government regimes that
concerned themselves with information.
Meanwhile, from the 1970s onward, the study of “information
asymmetries” popularized by George Akerlof and others, has influenced and
served as an important complement to the study of information production.3
The study of asymmetries is essentially concerned with the distribution, as
opposed to the creation of information. The basic observation that a
suboptimal distribution of information may yield a variety of problems (like
adverse selection, moral hazard or worse) has influenced most of the writing
described here.

The Spread of the Public Good Model
Today, some version of the public good model of information now
dominates analysis of the economics of information production. Among other
fields, scholars have applied information-as-public-good arguments to fields
as diverse as the regulation of securities, contract, consumer protection laws,
communication laws, and constitutional law, among others. However, as we
shall see, there are important variations in how the arguments appear in
different fields.
The use of public good arguments to justify grants of intellectual
property has perhaps the longest lineage – one probably older than the public
good model itself. Consider Lord Macaulay’s famous 1841 argument that
copyright is a “tax on readers for the purpose of giving a bounty to writers,”
justified because it is “desirable that we should have a supply of good books:
we cannot have such a supply unless men of letters are liberally
remunerated.”4 But the theory has spread far from its origins in intellectual
property. Since the 1980s, a public good theory of information has been used
to justify mandating the disclosure of information for consumer or investor
protection. “[B]ecause information has many characteristics of a public good,”
1

Id.; Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 REV. ECON. & STAT. 387, 387
(1954); Paul A. Samuelson, Diagrammatic Exposition of a Theory of Public Expenditure, 37 REV. ECON. &
STAT. 350 (1955).
2
(“In the absence of special legal protection, the owner cannot . . . simply sell information on the
open market. Any one purchaser can destroy the monopoly, since he can reproduce the information at little
or no cost.”).
3
The classic paper is George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the
Market Mechanism, 84 Quarterly Journal of Economics 488 (1970).
4
Lord Thomas Babington Macaulay, Speech Delivered in the House of Commons (Feb. 5, 1841),
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wrote Jack Coffee in 1984, “securities research tends to be underprovided.”5
The related concept of “informational” or “transparency” regulation such as
hazard warnings, medical disclosure, and certain forms of campaign finance
regulation has been justified using similar concepts.6 Daniel Farber has
relied on public good arguments to explain or justify the American First
Amendment’s protection of speech. “[I]nformation is likely not only to be
underproduced in the private market,” he writes, “but also to be insufficiently
protected by the political system.”7
In each area, the key theory is that there is a market failure: without
state action, important information will either be underproduced, or too much
will be kept secret from the public. On closer examination, there are actually
two different concerns here: underproduction and suboptimal distribution.
These, as we shall see, can be more generally tied to two properties of
information: non-exclusion, and non-rivalry, respectively.

Underproduction
John Stuart Mill’s original theory focused on non-exclusion. As he
wrote, “it is impossible that the ships at sea which are benefited by a
lighthouse, should be made to pay a toll on the occasion of its use.”8 The idea
is that if it is difficult or impossible to exclude non-payers from consuming
the good in question, no one will have an incentive to provide the good,
justifying public provisioning of the good. Jefferson, writing before Mill in
1813, opined similarly that an idea, once divulged, “forces itself into the
possession of everyone, and the receiver cannot dispossess himself of it.”9 In
contemporary times, it is commonplace to describe information as
“impossible” or “very difficult” to exclude anyone from.10
5

John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure System,
70 VA. L. REV. 717 (1984).
6
See, e.g., ARCHON FUNG, MARY GRAHAM & DAVID WEIL , FULL DISCLOSURE: THE PERILS AND
PROMISE OF TRANSPARENCY 46 (2007); Richard L. Hasen, Clipping Coupons for Democracy: An
Egalitarian/Public Choice Defense of Campaign Finance Vouchers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1, 26 (media
loopholes in campaign finance regulations) Mary L. Lyndon, Information Economics and Chemical
Toxicity: Designing Laws to Produce and Use Data, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1795, 1815 (1989) (chemical
toxicity disclosure). WESLEY A. MAGAT AND W. KIP VISCUSI, INFORMATIONAL APPROACHES TO
REGULATION (REGULATION OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY) (1992).
7
Daniel A. Farber, Free Speech Without Romance: Public Choice and the First Amendment, 105
HARV. L. REV. 554, 561 (1991).
8
Mill, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., Book V, Chapter XI, Sec. 15. See also
Samuelson, Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, supra note 1, at 387. This point was famously challenged
by Coase, who established that private lighthouses were funded by port fees. Ronald Coase, The
Lighthouse in Economics, 17 J.L. & ECON. 357 (1974) (“We may conclude that economists should not use
the lighthouse as an example of a service which could only be provided by the government.”).
9
Letter to Isaac McPherson, Monticello, August 13 1813, THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON
326-338 (A. Lipscomb ed., 1904).
10
E.g., James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public Domain,
66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 42 (2003) (“[Ideas] are also assumed to be non-excludable (it is
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It makes sense that a concern about the underproduction of
information ought depend on a concern about non-excludability. The idea is
that if the producer of information cannot exclude non-payers, he will lack
the means to recoup his initial investment, hence eliminating any desire to
create information in the first place. If an author invests heavily in writing a
book, and then lacks any mechanism to exclude non-payers, he will be unable
to reap the proceeds of his investment later, and therefore will have no direct
financial incentive to write books in the first place (though he might have
indirect or personal incentives). More realistically, we might say that if there
is no mechanism for excluding non-payers, that publishers would be unlikely
to invest in an author’s work, therefore making a career as an author difficult
to support.
The key question, then is whether there is something about
information that makes it impossible to exclude non-payers from consuming.
A moment’s reflection makes it obvious that in most contexts this premise is
cannot be right, at least in its strong form. Consider the text of a book
locked in a vault for which the key is lost: we are all excluded from it. If you
don’t have a ticket, you won’t see that movie. The information contained in
an engraving written in a lost language, like hieroglyphs before the discovery
of the Rosetta stone, is inaccessible to everyone.
Two basic ideas from the basic science of information make it clear
why the non-excludability assumption is hard to support. First, information
consists of patterns, which must subsist in some physical or electronic form -ink on paper, stored magnetic charges, or whatever else. Second, for a
human to process information, that information must reach the brain (unlike,
say, national defense, which can be consumed unknowingly), and be in a form
that the brain can process. These necessities combine to suggest one can
exclude others from information.
Why, then, have so many thinkers insisted that information has the
“property” of non-excludability? What writers like Jefferson or Mill seem to
have meant by non-excludability seems to be something meant at a high level
of abstraction, really a property of knowledge or wisdom more than
impossible, or at least hard, to stop one unit of the good from satisfying an infinite number of users at zero
marginal cost).”); Kimberly D. Krawiec, Fairness Efficiency, and Insider Trading: Deconstructing the
Coin of the Realm in the Information Age, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 443, 451 (2001) (“By labeling information a
collective good in this Article, I do not mean to imply that it is literally impossible to exclude
nonpurchasers, but rather the slightly weaker condition that such exclusion is extremely difficult.”); Peter
S. Menell, An Analysis of the Scope of Copyright Protection for Application Programs, 41 Stan. L. Rev.
1045, 1046 (1989) (“As [the National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works]
well recognized, the information comprising innovation in application programs is a prime example of a
public good. Given the ease and low cost of copying application programs, it is often impossible to exclude
nonpurchasers from an application program's benefits once it is commercially available. “).
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information. For example, one might be the beneficiary of the Christian
injunction to “love thy neighbor as thyself” without ever hearing the phrase.
Similarly, you might enjoy the comforts of air-conditioning without having
read any of the original patents. But this is different that being a property
of information.
Alternatively, sometimes what is meant by the “non-excludability” of
information is really the idea that it is cheap to copy information. Since the
invention of the printing press, and especially since digitalization, copying
information is usually far cheaper than creating valuable information. This
point can also be expressed by saying that information goods have a high
initial and low marginal cost of production.
The fact that non-excludability is not some intrinsic quality of
information, but a technological contingency is a challenge for the intellectual
property laws. Stephen Breyer noticed as much in 1970, when he argued that
copyright is hard to justify given the existence of alternative means of
exclusion, such as the “lead time” enjoyed, in 1970, by the first publisher of a
book.11 Breyer’s argument has been criticized for its technological naïveté
(the piece presumed, for example, that software would be hard to copy), but
the central insight seems correct; namely, when copying is expensive, the
case for government intervention weakens. That’s why, for example, the
later Picasso never suffered from a lack of financial incentives to paint,
because only he could create a Picasso. The prospect of non-legal
mechanisms of exclusion is what Chris Sprigman and Kal Rastiala rely on in
their study of creative industries, like fashion, cooking, and stand-up comedy,
which seem to prosper without intellectual property.12 In each, the industry
devises its own means of exclusion, which seem good enough to incentivize
production. Eben Moglen argues that since non-market mechanisms yield
sufficient information production, the actual effect of the creation of
exclusionary rights in information is merely a giant wealth transfer from the
proletariat to the bourgeoisie.13
11

Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and
Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281, 299-302 (1970) (“A copying publisher, faced with the
problems of ‘lead time’ and ‘retaliation’ is unlikely to see much profit in copying low-volume titles. It
seems unlikely, for example, that a publisher thinking of copying the type of tradebook that now sells about
4000 copies, would count on selling the 2000 or more copies needed to earn a profit.”).
12
KAL RAUSTIALA AND CHRISTOPHER SPRIGMAN, THE KNOCKOFF ECONOMY: HOW IMITATION
SPARKS INNOVATION (2012).
13
Eben Moglen, The dotCommunist Manifesto, at 3-4 (2003),
http://emoglen.law.columbia.edu/my_pubs/dcm.pdf (“Creators of knowledge, technology, and culture
discover that they no longer require the structure of production based on ownership and the structure of
distribution based on coercion of payment. Association, and its anarchist model of propertyless production,
makes possible the creation of free software, through which creators gain control of the technology of
further production.”). See also Breyer, supra, note 11, at 289 (“We do not ordinarily create or modify
property rights, nor even award compensation, solely on the basis of labor expended.”).
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Nowadays most scholars hedge their bets by describing exclusion as
partially non-excludable, “hard” to exclude people from, or by drawing a line
between private and public information.14 Some scholars, like Christopher
Yoo, Amy Kapczynski, and Talha Syed argue that non-excludability shouldn’t
be considered a defining feature of information at all. Yoo, writing in 2007,
suggested that the costs of exclusion depend on the technological context of
consumption, rather than the any inherent characteristic of information.15
Hence, it may be very expensive to exclude the ships that benefit from a light
house, but that is irrelevant to whether people without tickets may be kept
out of a movie theater on opening night. Consequently, Yoo argues that
information should be understood an “impure” public good, yielding policy
outcomes different than the pure public goods assumption.16 Kapczynski and
Syed argue that excludability is “highly variable across information goods,
and is affected not only by formal legal entitlements, but also by existing
technologies for detecting or tracing such uses (and their costs); existing
social norms regarding ‘acceptable’ or ‘reasonable’ enforcement efforts (in
light of concerns about privacy, freedom of thought and speech, and so forth);
and the existing institutions—or social roles, relations, and organizational
forms—within which the predominant uses of the good will be made.”17
The weakness of the non-excludability assumption cannot be said to
have destroyed the case for intellectual property or other forms of
government action. Defenders of the intellectual property regimes have
attempted to justify intellectual property property by relying on several
alternative theories.
First, one might rely not on the assumption of non-excludability, but,
as stated above, the empirical observation that it is, in today’s technological
context, usually cheaper to copy information than create it in the first place.
Whether low marginal costs of production are intrinsic to information, or
14
Yochai Benkler, in a typical example, writes, “Information is generally understood to be perfectly
nonrival and partially nonexcludable.” Yochai Benkler, An Unhurried View of Private Ordering in
Informational Transactions, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2063, 2066 (2000).
15
Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright and Public Good Economics: A Misunderstood Relation, 155 U.
PA. L. REV. 635, 659 (2007) (“Indeed, it has long been recognized that exclusion is typically possible, with
the costs of exclusion depending on the state of technology.”). Yoo attributes this point to Francis M. Bator,
The Anatomy of Market Failure, 72 Q.J. Econ. 351, 370 (1958) (describing how nonappropriability can
cause market failure).
16
See Yoo, supra note 15. Yoo’s argument is more complex than captured by this sentence. More
specifically, he believes that Samuelson’s theory of public goods does not depend on non-rivalry and nonexcludability, but rather, a condition whereby consumers consume the same quantity of the good and signal
their preferences by prices, the inverse of the situation with private goods. Yoo believes that this
incentivizes users of a public good to understate their true willingness to pay, in the hopes that others will
bear the costs of creating that good. Id. at 670.
17
Amy Kapczynski, Talha Syed, The Continuum of Excludability and the Limits of Patents, 122
YALE L.J. 1900, 1903 (2013).
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simply a matter of technological context is an interesting one and not subject
to easy answer. In the days when monks copied bibles by hand, copying costs
were perhaps comparable to the costs of creating the work in the first place.
However, ever since the invention of the printing press, copying information
has tended to be cheaper than producing it, which is an explanation for the
appearance of the earliest copyright laws in that era.
In any event, the low marginal cost of production for informational
goods creates a free-riding argument. Represented in accounts by Tom
Palmer, among others,18 the argument asserted that the production of
information would naturally create, within groups, either problems of
collective action or a “tragedy of the commons.” Given an incentive to copy
information and thereby free-ride on the production efforts of others, none
will be incentivized to produce information, therefore yielding less production
than might be ideal. This argument depends not on the impossibility of
excluding consumers, but the low costs of copying in certain contexts, as just
discussed.19
Second, some scholars justify the existence of government enforcement
of intellectual property rights by stressing the costs of the alternatives. The
creators of information tend to regard it as theirs, and want to protect it.
When private parties rely on private remedies, those remedies may
themselves be quite socially expensive. Consider that real property can be
defended by its owners using fences and armed guards, yet government
grants exclusion rights in land, whether to encourage investment, or to
facilitate the development of markets. In the Hobbesian sense, the legal
system may be a less wasteful alternative to private exclusion schemes, for
example, if it displaces expensive warfare between information-producers
and their copiers.20
This scholarship tends to allude to the costs of “races” of various
kinds, including “arms races” between copiers and creators. “The existence
of a cost-effective self-help remedy,” argues Douglas Lichtman, should not
always preclude “government regulation as a means to accomplish similar
ends.”21 In another example in the scholarship, Scott Hemphill and Jeannie
Suk argue that in the fashion industry an inability to exclude copiers creates
a reliance on “logoification.” That, they argue, “pull[s] fashion toward a
18

Tom G. Palmer, Intellectual Property: A Non-Posnerian Law and Economics Approach, 12
HAMLINE L. REV. 261, 285 (1989); Edmund Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L.
& ECON. 265 (1977). See also Kenneth W. Dam, Self-Help in the Digital Jungle, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 393
(1999); F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing Inventions, 85 MINN. L.
REV. 697 (2001).
19
Palmer, supra note 18 at 285.
20
Lee Kovarsky, A Technological Theory of the Arms Race, 81 IND. L.J. 917 (2006).
21
Douglas Lichtman, How the Law Responds to Self-Help (2004).
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status-conferring function and away from the communication of diverse
messages.”22
Third, intellectual property has sometimes been separatly justified by
what might be described as a Demsetzian theory. The idea is that group use
of a given resource, like information, will create externalities of various sorts
that should be internalized by property rights. For example, Ed Kitch in a
famous 1977 paper argued that patent ought to give out broad “prospects” –
that is, a patent covering the initial invention and subsequent inventions as
well. Otherwise, Kitch argued, the owner might lack incentives to make
further investments in research beyond the initial invention in research for
fear that the benefits will be appropriated by others.
Kitch’s idea has faced criticism too voluminous to summarize: Mark
Lemley’s 2004 criticism is typical, and echoes earlier papers by Carol Rose,
Wendy Gordon and others.23 Lemley, as in his other work, relies on the
nature of information; it “cannot be depleted,” he wrote, and therefore is not
subject to a tragedy of the commons or the negative externalities that justify
real property rights. Rather, by its very nature, the tendency was for the
creation of information to throw off positive externalities – such as the
example of the multiple beneficiaries of the invention of the steam engine.
Compensation for positive externalities, or spillovers, Lemley argued in this
and other works,24 should almost never be the subject of government
intervention. “If ‘free riding’ means merely obtaining a benefit from another’s
investment, the law does not, cannot, and should not prohibit it.”25
Fourth and finally, where the public good model doesn’t strongly
justify intervention, it is certainly possible government may have entirely
different goals in mind unrelated to the economics of information. For
example, a strong copyright or patent regime may be understood as a subsidy
for the entertainment or pharmaceutical industries. As such the law might
really draw little justification from the economics of information, but rather
22

C. Scott Hemphill & Jeannie Suk, The Law, Culture, and Economics of Fashion, 61 STAN. L. REV.
1147 (2009).
23
Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L.
REV. 129, 143 n. 52 (2004). Carol Rose wrote that the case for property rights is inherently weaker in what
she labeled “intellectual space” because “there is no physical resource to be ruined by overuse. Books,
tapes, and words may be copied, inventions may be imitated, pictures may be reproduced all without the
slightest damage to the original.” Carol M. Rose, Romans, Roads, and Romantic Creators: Traditions of
Public Property in the Information Age, 66 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 89, 90 (2003).
24
Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257, 299-300 (2007)
(“Such intervention may be unnecessary and in fact may lead to welfare-reducing distortions.”).
25
Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1049
(2005). See also Wendy Gordon, On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the Restitutionary
Impulse, 78 VA. L. REV. 149, 167 (1992) (“A culture could not exist if all free riding were prohibited
within it.").
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be better described as such be a form of industrial policy, or perhaps a
component of a “strategic trade policy.” Such laws might also be understood
as a form of political patronage.
If nothing more, a generation of scholarship on the existence of private
exclusion mechanisms should force any contemporary policy-maker to
consider the comparative efficiency of private and public reward schemes for
the production of information products, along with due consideration of the
choice among public alternatives. That point is central to Raustiala and
Springman’s writings and also has led Steven Shavell, among others, to
conclude that an optional reward would be more efficient than a pure patent
system for incentivizing research.26

Information Distribution Problems
Problems of information distribution, or “under-dissemination” form a
problem distinct from under-production. Here, the problem can be phrased
ass follows. Markets and other systems involving human decisions (like
elections) require a certain amount of information to function well and may
also require that the information be distributed symmetrically among buyers
and sellers (or their equivalents). Where information is scarce, or if
distributed asymmetrically, systemic failure can be expected. By metaphor,
information may act like oil in an engine, and if insufficient, the engine may
seize. While some quantity of information is disseminated naturally, so to
speak, the idea that natural sources will be inadequate tends to support some
forms of public or private intervention to ensure enough information is
disseminated to keep things running smoothly.
As described above, the problem of information distribution was a
focused of the information asymmetry literature whose origins were in the
the 1970s. Among that literature’s first prominent area of legal relevance
was the analysis of capital markets: in 1984, law professors Ronald J. Gilson
and Reinier H. Kraakman theorized that the distribution of information was a

key determinant of capital market efficiency. Hence, institutions (like investment
banks) capable of reducing the costs of obtaining information, and thereby making
information more widespread, increased the efficiency of the capital markets.27
Writing in the same year, Jack Coffee argued that the need for investors to
have adequate information to make investment decisions justified the
26
Yochai Benkler, similarly, suggests that there may be alternative private models of producing
valuable information that depend on what he terms “peer production” models. Yochai Benkler, THE
WEALTH OF NETWORKS (2006).
27
Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REv.
549 (1984).
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existence of regulations requiring disclosure of financial information. The
argument that a market needs information in order to function efficiently has
also been used to justify the existence of quasi-private institutions like credit
rating organizations.28
But capital markets are not the only systems that require adequate
and well distributed information to function well. Markets for consumer
goods and services do as well, yielding theoretical support for interventions
like consumer warnings, the publication of nutritional information, 29 or the
consumer protection requirement that information on labels be generally
accurate.30 In financial regulation, the market for money claims has been
said to depend on the maintenance of symmetric ignorance.31
Non-market systems, like the political system or elections, also require
information to function well, which may justify various measures, such as the
prohibition of political censorship in the First Amendment.32
The extent to the need for better distribution of information justifies
government interventions depends on whether the private mechanisms of
distribution are adequate. This is a question which is very hard to answer in
the abstract. Gilson and Kraakman theorized that the “distribution of a
particular piece of information is a function of its cost,” by which they meant
the cost of acquiring it or perhaps of producing it. They suggested that
private mechanisms, like investment banks, might aid the distribution of
information, but did not make clear when such mechanisms might be
adequate. It is also true that markets themselves are, as Thomas J.
Fitzpatrick & Chris Sagers put it, “machines for generating information” and
many financial economists have long supposed that markets generate enough
information to generate accurate prices without much intervention.33 Other
the other hand, it is obvious that there is much important information that
one cannot expect to be widely distributed without any public intervention.
Some might be simply too expensive to be worth producing (like census
28

See, e.g., Lawrence J. White, The Credit Rating Industry:An Industrial Organization Analysis, in
RATINGS, RATING AGENCIES AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM 43-44 (Richard M. Levich et al. eds.,
2002), but see THOMAS J. FITZPATRICK, IV & CHRIS SAGERS, Faith Based Financial Regulation: A Primer
On Oversight Of Credit Rating Organizations, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 557 (2009) (questioning whether CROs
can be justified by information-production or disseminating role).
29
See, e.g., Tom Valuck, Keeping Dietary Supplement Regulations Slim and Fit: Finding a Healthy
Balance Between Paternalism and Consumer Choice, 2 Geo. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 285, 305 (2004) (discussing
the need for government intervention in the provision of information about dietary supplements). More
broadly, see Magat & Viscusi, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined..
30
See, Fung, et. al, supra note 6; Magat & Viscusi, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined.;
William M. Sage, Regulating Through Information: Disclosure Laws and American Health Care, 99
COLUM. L. REV. 1701, 1771-72 (1999); Cass R. Sunstein,Informational Regulation and Informational
Standing: Akins and Beyond, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 613 (1999).
31
See Kathryn Judge, Information Gaps and Shadow Banking (2016).
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information), causing the public good problem described above. For other
forms of information, the parties who hold will have good reason to hide it.
Companies might want to hide their true revenues and profits, or the fact
that a product is defective or causes disease. In these sort of situations
scholars and government have suggested public action is necessary.
While the literature centered on information asymmetries and the
previous discussion of underproduction are authored by different groups of
scholars, a moments analysis reveals that they rely on the same conceptual
framework, and ultimately the same observations about information itself.
Asymmetries are typically assumed to result from some initial allocation of
information that is expensive to overcome. Another way to express the same
point is to suggest that high information costs cause problems.34 If the
marginal cost of disseminating information is low, anyone who values the
information at even a fraction of a penny should have it; otherwise, there is
deadweight loss. The concern, therefore, is that the full value of information
to the public, and in particular, to consumers of the information, will go
unrealized.
But what might make problems of distribution of information different
than any other good or commodity? The differences lies in the key concept of
“non-rivalry,” which is the link between the information asymmetry
literature and the public good scholarship. The concept is simply that
consumption of information does not reduce its utility for others. Your
reading of my book doesn’t “use it up,” the same way that eating my
sandwich does. This concept is expressed by economists in various ways,
including the idea that information is “infinite in supply,” or experiences
“jointness of consumption.” In mathematic models, non-rivalry is captured by
the assumption of zero marginal cost of production.
Perhaps reflecting its slightly mysterious quality, legal writers have
often employed parables or analogies to capture the concept of non-rivalry.
Mark Lemley writes, “if I give you a fish, I no longer have it, but if I teach
you to fish, you or I can teach a hundred others the same skill without
appreciably reducing its value.”35 The most famous parable is Thomas
Jefferson’s analogy to fire and air. “He who receives an idea from me,
receives instruction himself without lessening mine; as he who lights his
taper at mine, receives light without darkening me.” Therefore, ideas are
34
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“like fire, expansible over all space, without lessening their density in any
point, and like the air in which we breathe, move, and have our physical
being, incapable of confinement or exclusive appropriation.” Jefferson took
this to mean that private rights in ideas cannot be justified “[i]f nature has
made any one thing less susceptible than all others of exclusive property, it is
the action of the thinking power called an idea.”36
Copyright’s fair use doctrine, while sometimes said to overcome
failures of bargaining, has sometimes been justified by what is, on closer
inspection, the solution to a distributional problem. Provided the producer is
unaffected, or not unduly affected, the non-rivalrous nature of information
suggests the public should want others to use the information at a price
approaching zero. The famous Sony decision, which held legal the home
taping of TV shows for later viewing, is easily viewed as the solution to an
underuse problem.37 If the home taping did not actually deplete or affect the
value of the television shows, there was no good reason not to allow it. We
might say the court set the price at zero.
The analogies to fish and fire notwithstanding, it is worth asking, as
we did with non-excludability: does information actually have the
characteristics of non-rivalry? In its purest form, this concept would presume
that one’s usage of information would no effect on another’s, that “a unit of
the good can be consumed by one individual without detracting, in the
slightest, from the consumption opportunities still available to others from
that same unit.”38 To use a common example, it seems implausible that one
person’s use of a stop sign would change that experience for someone else.
Some scholars seem to firmly believe that information’s non-rivalry is
an incontestable, as a matter of physics rather than law or economics. “The
degree to which a good is or is not rivalrous is a fact of nature,” writes Yochai
Benkler “a thing either does, or does not have this unusual attribute that,
once produced, many can enjoy it without added cost.”39 But others argue
that information, like private goods, might in fact sometimes be “overgrazed”
or suffer from congestion, like a parcel of land or a highway.40 The
trademark laws, which employ concepts like blurring, tarnishing, and
dilution, seems to contemplate this possibility, and in a 2002 paper, Richard
Posner and William Landes so asserted explicitly. 41 They argued that
36
37
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excessive use of an image of Humphrey Bogart, for example, over time might
cause “confusion, the tarnishing of the image, or sheer boredom …
[e]ventually the image might become worthless.”42 Turning to the well-known
character of Mickey Mouse, Posner and Landes argued that the character
might similarly become over-grazed without proper management: “not only
would the public rapidly tire of Mickey Mouse, but his image would be
blurred, as some authors portrayed him as a Casanova, others as catmeat,
others as an animal-rights advocate, still others as the henpecked husband of
Minnie.”43
Posner and Landes’s assertion has gained a few adherents,44 but has
also been subject to sharp criticism.45 Such congestion arguments, argued
Mark Lemley, “misunderstand[] the nature of information,” which “cannot be
depleted.” Christopher Yoo argues that the Posner & Landes argument is
hard to sustain beyond the particular examples of celebrity images or
characters, which have an unusual economics all of their own. Yoo accepts
the possibility of congestion, but notes that usage of information will not
predictably decrease its value;46 moreover, if there are congestion
externalities, says Yoo, they might be either technological or pecuniary; and
if the latter, the policy implications become highly ambiguous.47
Examples make clear that congestion problems or overgrazing
concerns are certainly not present for all forms of information. (This is a
point Landes and Posner concede by alluding to Shakespeare’s works which
“seem undiminished by the proliferation of performances and derivative
works, some of them kitsch.”)48 Strictly speaking, Landes and Posner were
writing about copyrighted works, which are a subset of information, but
consider a factual discovery like the circumference of the earth. While clearly
a form of valuable information, how it might get used up or tarnished is
unclear. Even if a central plot element in a bad romantic comedy, the
number (40,075 km) would retain its value and remain useful to others.
What does seem to be potentially subject to dilution or tarnishing is not the
information itself, but something like the reputation attached to the
information, which seems an analytically distinct category.
471 (2003).
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The idea that underusage is a problem also depends on information
actually being non-rivalous, or infinite in supply, not just as an ideal object,
but as a market reality – how often is the information itself is actually the
relevant good? Thomas Nachbar argues that for many purposes it is other
economic factors that policy should concern itself with. “Intellectual works”
he states, “do not exist except as the product of human labor, which is itself
the subject of considerable rivalry.”49 For example, in the case International
New Service v. Associated Press, as Nachbar explains, it may have been true
that the information taken from one news service by another was a public
good. However, the court was, according to Nachbar, concerned not with the
unusual properties of information, but competition for profit as between the
two news services. His point is that esoteric questions about the nature of
information, such as those just considered at length here, can often be
irrelevant for many markets.
***
We can here summarize the current state of understanding.
Information is widely agreed to have unusual properties as compared to
physical resources, chief among which are some measure of non-rivalry, nonexclusivity, and a low marginal cost of production. These properties have
been used both to justify specialized legal regimes designed either to
overcome underproduction and asymmetry problems. The extent of all of
these properties is contested, both as a mater of theory and market reality, or
said to be context-dependent.
This tends to suggest that the case for laws governing information is
difficult to state generally, and may vary widely by industry, context, or the
means of production involved. While describing information as a public good
provides a simple justification for government intervention, as Ronald Coase
famously pointed out with respect to lighthouses, the reality is often far more
complex (there were, in fact, private lighthouses).50 This lends support to the
idea, for example, that the subject matter of copyright and patent might be
better served by rules that are adjusted by an ongoing judicial process, rather
than being subject to blanket rules. In areas outside of intellectual property,
it similarly suggests that regulators ought to pay careful attention to
determine whether, in fact, the information they wish to see disclosed
requires intervention, and how effectively consumers will really make use of
the information.
It is also curious that, given the myriad properties of information, non49
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excludability and non-rivalry have received so much attention. One may be
suspicious that the attention may be prompted by its neatness of fit into the
pre-existing concept of a public good more than the underlying realities of
what properties information holds. In any event, it is worth suggesting that
lawyers’ or economists’ understanding of information’s properties might be
broader, and begin to draw less on just anecdotal examples, but some study of
the science of information. Indeed, it may turn out that information’s other
properties, less studied, will be equally important for public policy.
Consider, for example, the question of what effect usage has on the
market value of information. While the question has not been well studied,
two views are implied by the literature: namely the “overgrazing” view that
information necessarily degrades or is tarnished by usage, and its rejoinder
that usage cannot have any effect on the value of information. Neither seems
to be exactly correct, and the relationship between usage and value may in
fact be more complicated than first appears.
It is interesting to notice that many suppliers in the information
economy devote themselves to trying to convince the public to consume
information, and will even sometimes pay them to do so. The idea of the
“attention economy” refers to concentrated efforts by suppliers not to avoid
the usage of their information, but to encourage it to the broadest extent
possible – captured by the desire to see information “go viral” and reach
millions of users. This is not a new phenomenon – record labels have long
wanted their music to play on the radio, and have long been willing to pay
radio stations to, in effect, give away their product for free. If information
were predictably subject to overgrazing, this would be a terrible idea;
similarly, if information’s value could not possibly be affected by usage, why
try so hard to get people to consume it?
One obvious explanation is that this is all advertising (itself not well
understood). Advertising, in John Kenneth Galbraith’s account, is a tool for
creating demand, and by this theory the song is played to create demand for
itself.51 But that doesn’t tell us enough: advertising makes sense when it is
for another product, and indeed the usual definition of the word “advertising”
is to “call attention to goods for sale.” It seems a different matter when
information generates demand for itself, and therefore, by usage, increases
its own value. Watching the exploits of Iron Man on the screen or page may
generate an insatiable appetite for more Iron Man. By establishing itself in
the minds of consumers in this way, information can become incredibly
valuable, in part because it can then be used to draw consumers to still other
objects by an attention merchant.52
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A different theory suggests that we are approaching the problem
incorrectly, for someone listening to a “free” song or watching a “free” video is
actually paying for it, not in units of money, but in human attention, a highly
scarce resource. Deciding to spend time with any information should be seen
as an expenditure, dissolving the apparent paradox.
In the law, trademark is best acquainted with this dynamic. With its
doctrines of blurring, tarnishment, and dilution, trademark seems to
recognize that certain uses of information might reduce the value of
information, or its reputation. On the other hand, firms pay millions to have
their brands announced during sporting events, or placed in Times Square to
be consumed by millions without payment, or even to have the brand mocked
or portrayed in strange circumstances, so long as there is exposure (consider
the prominent role played by FedEx in the film Cast Away). The result of
such mass exposure is rarely degradation, but rather, the creation of brands,
which are easily the most valuable form of intellectual property.
A final theory relies on the idea that a certain class of informational
goods gets more valuable with usage. They are what Cass R. Sunstein and
Edna Ullmann-Margalit call “solidarity goods”: goods that increase in value
with joint consumption.53 As the authors write, “Solidarity goods have more
value to the extent that other people are enjoying them.” While solidarity
goods are not exclusively informational, many of Sunstein and UllmannMargalit’s examples are forms of information. “The value of a magazine or
television program focusing on a current topic (genetic engineering of food, for
example) may increase significantly if many other people watch or read
them.” This suggests that, rather than trying to discourage usage of some
information, the owner of the information has some incentive to increase
consumption of the information in question and so as to maximize the value
of the good.
The theory of solidarity goods also seems an incomplete explanation.
It does not explain, for example, the intuition that a song may become more
valuable by repeated play to even a single consumer, regardless of any group
effects. But, in any event, understanding these mechanisms is one of many
ways we might better understand the information economy and its
regulation. It might entail trying to better understand the competition for
cognitive space and attention that is so central to the information economy.
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